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IMPLIED DEDICATION: A THREAT
TO THE OWNERS OF
CALIFORNIA'S SHORELINE
With the increase of urbanization and the general rise in pop-
ulation, the people of California are confronted with a shortage of
open recreational land, particularly public beach land.1 In a recent
opinion consolidating two cases, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and
Dietz v. King,2 the Supreme Court of California handed down a
decision which may help remedy this shortage.
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz3 concerns three lots of shoreline
land of approximately 480 feet in length with a depth varying
from 70 to 160 feet. Each lot contained some land which overlooked
the sea about 30 to 40 feet above sea level. For 60 years the
public used the lots as a parking area. The land was also used for
fishing, swimming and other recreational activities. Since 1900 the
city facilitated the public's use by posting signs, filling holes, in-
stalling an alarm system and paving the parking lot.4 The sanita-
tion department provided trash receptacles and cleaned the area
after heavy use.
The owner, Mr. Gion, did not object to the public's use, nor
did he grant permission to the public to use his land. The superior
court found Gion to be the fee owner, but declared the fee to be
subject to an easement in the City of Santa Cruz for itself, and on
behalf of the public, in, on, over, and across the property for public
recreational purposes.5 This easement right included, but was not
limited to, parking, fishing, picnicking, general viewing, public pro-
tection and policing, as well as erosion control. However, the ease-
ment did not give the City or the public the right to construct any
permanent structures on the land.'
In Dietz v. King,7 the plaintiffs, as representatives of the public,
filed a class action seeking to enjoin the defendant, King, from in-
terfering with the public's use of Navarro Beach and an unimproved
dirt road, Navarro Beach Road, which led to that beach. The beach
in question is a sandy peninsula surrounded by cliffs and bounded
1 Comment, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. 1,v. 564, 565 (1970).
2 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v. King, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84
Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as Gion).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 35, 465 P.2d at 53, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
5 Id. at 35, 465 P.2d at 53, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66.
8 Id. at 35, 465 P.2d at 54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
7 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
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by Navarro River. Navarro Beach Road was the only convenient
access to the beach. There was evidence that the public had used
the road and the beach for over 100 years. None of the previous
owners of the King property had ever objected to public use of
Navarro Beach Road.
In 1960, King attempted to block the road. The public repeat-
edly destroyed his barriers and continued to use the land until 1966
when King hired a construction crew to permanently block the road.
That act prompted members of the public to bring the class action.
The superior court ruled in favor of the defendant, stating that there
had been no dedication of the beach or of the road. The California
Supreme Court affirmed Gion and reversed Dietz, finding a dedica-
tion in both cases of a public recreational easement.
These cases constitute a great threat to the owners of beach-
land8 in California who have not objected to the public use of their
land, and who have not been cautious enough to have affirmatively
granted a license to the public. A landowner's past generosity may
have created permanent rights in the public without evidence that
the landowner intended such a result.
IMPLIED DEDICATION PRIOR TO GION
Dedication is a common law principle that enables a private
landowner to donate his land for some public use. To accomplish
common law dedication, there must be unequivocal proof that the
owner intended to dedicate his land.' ° Such proof may be provided
by the express words of the owner or it may be implied by various
acts of the owner which manifest his intent to dedicate."
Where dedication is implied from the owner's acts, the public
8 Although the facts in Gion were concerned with beach land, and the court
alluded to a number of statutes that indicated public policy favored access to the
shoreline, see note 48, infra, we are dealing essentially with common law principles
of implied dedication. Therefore, it is not likely that the courts will limit the Gion
opinion to beach land areas.
9 11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33.02 (3d rev. ed.
1964) ; 2 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 369 at 462 (1961).
10 Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal. 2d 235, 240, 267 P.2d 10,
14 (1954); F. A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 448, 150 P. 62, 70
(1915); Comment, Dedication of Land in California, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 559, 560
(1965); 11 E. McQuniuN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33.03 (3d rev.
ed. 1964) ; 2 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 370 at 471-72 (1961) ; 4 H. TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1101 (3d ed. 1939).
11 Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal. 2d 235, 240, 267 P.2d 10,
14 (1954); Comment, Dedication of Land in California, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 559, 560
(1965); 11 E. McQuniLiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33.03 (3d rev.
ed. 1964); 2 G. THOMPSON, REAL. PROPERTY § 370 at 471-72 (1961); 4 H. TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1101 (3d ed. 1939).
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normally bases its claim on the fact that the public has used the
land for a long period of time. 2 Such use by the public is termed
"public user," and means actual use and enjoyment by the public of
some right or property. 13
Two theories have developed in the cases which enable "public
user" to have one of two effects on a finding of dedication. An offer
to dedicate land may be inferred from the owner's long acquiescence
in public user under circumstances which negate the idea that the
use was under a license.' 4 Or, a conclusive presumption of dedica-
tion will arise on a finding of "adverse public user" for a period of
five or more consecutive years. 15
Public user alone has been held not to negate the idea of a
license since public user is as consistent with a finding of a license
as it is with a finding of dedication. The party claiming dedication
must offer more evidence than mere public user; he must present
evidence which demonstrates that the owner's acts were inconsistent
with a mere license. 16
For example, if the original owners of adjoining property agree
to create an alley by each offering a ten foot strip, the circumstances
indicate an intent to dedicate rather than the granting of a license.
In such a case a court will base its decision on the fact that
all subsequent deeds from the original owners do not mention or
include the ten foot strip.' 7 Likewise, a landowner's asking public
authorities for permission to make changes on his land is incon-
sistent with an intent to maintain full control, negating the idea
of license.'8
In addition to public user giving rise to an inference of offer to
dedicate under specific circumstances, public user for the period of
time required to gain prescriptive rights causes a conclusive pre-
sumption of dedication to arise.'9 Such is the case only where the
12 Public user is involved in the cases either for purposes of showing the owner's
intent to dedicate, or merely for representing the public's acceptance of the owner's
offer.
13 BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1711 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
14 See City of San Diego v. Hall, 180 Cal. 165, 179 P. 889 (1919); F. A. Hihn
Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 150 P. 62 (1915); Niles v. City of Los
Angeles, 125 Cal. 572, 58 P. 190 (1899); Hargo v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623, 26 P. 1106
(1891).
15 See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
16 See Niles v. City of Los Angeles, 125 Cal. 572, 58 P. 190 (1899) ; Cooper v.
Monterey County, 104 Cal. 437, 38 P. 106 (1894); Latham v. City of Los Angeles,
87 Cal. 514, 25 P. 673 (1891).
17 Hargo v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623, 26 P. 1106 (1891).
18 People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d 702 (1951).
19 See Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal. 2d 235, 267 P.2d 10
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public has used the land without asking for or receiving permission
from the owner and without objection from anyone. ° This is some-
times referred to as "adverse public user."'" Furthermore, while
causing a conclusive presumption of knowledge and acquiescence
to arise, adverse public user simultaneously negates the idea of mere
license. 2
In any case, the ultimate issue is whether public user for the
prescriptive period is under a license from the owner. If public
user is pursuant to a license, it is permissive rather than adverse,
and the conclusive presumption will not arise. The question of
whether use is permissive or adverse is ordinarily one of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances of the case.23 Long continued
use without objection by the owner is one of the bases for a finding
of adversity.24
In Hartley v. Vermillion,25 a road had been used by the public
for over fifteen years. Witnesses at the trial testified that they used
the road without asking permission from anyone and without objec-
tion by anyone. One of the former owners of the land testified that
he never gave anyone permission to use the land and that he never
objected to the public's use. The court, in finding a dedication,
stated that where the owner has not hindered the public's use of
his road for more than ten years, the presumption that use of the
road was by license is negated.26
The difference between the cases giving rise to an inference of
offer to dedicate on a finding of public user and those cases giving
rise to a conclusive presumption of dedication on a finding of adverse
public user for five or more years was expressed by the California
Supreme Court in Schwerdtle v. County of Placer :27
(1954) ; Hare v. Craig, 206 Cal. 753, 276 P. 336 (1929) ; Arnold v. City of San Diego,
120 Cal. App. 2d 353, 261 P.2d 33 (1953).
20 Id.
21 See Diamond Match Co. v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665, 24 P.2d 783 (1933);
People v. Myring, 144 Cal. 351, 77 P. 975 (1904).
22 Diamond Match Co. v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665, 24 P.2d 783 (1933);
Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 P. 448 (1895); Arnold v. City of San
Diego, 120 Cal. App. 2d 353, 261 P.2d 33 (1953).
23 Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal. 2d 235, 240-41, 267 P.2d
10, 13 (1954); O'Banion v. Borba, 32 Cal. 2d 145, 149-50, 195 P.2d 10, 12 (1948).
24 See Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal. 28, 87 P. 908 (1906); Hartley v. Vermillion,
141 Cal. 339, 74 P. 987 (1903) ; Barnes v. Daveck, 7 Cal. App. 487, 94 P. 779 (1908).
But see Lyons v. Schwartz, 40 Cal. App. 2d 60, 65, 104 P.2d 383, 386 (1940), for the
proposition that long user might raise a presumption of intent to dedicate, but not a
conclusive presumption of such intent.
25 Hartley v. Vermillion, 141 Cal. 339, 74 P. 987 (1903).
26 Id. at 349, 74 P. at 991.
27 Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 P. 448 (1895).
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If a dedication is sought to be established by use which has continued
a short time-not long enough to perfect the rights of the public under
the rules of prescription-then truly the actual consent or acquiescence
of the owner is an essential matter. . . . But where the claim of the
public rests upon long-continued adverse use, that use establishes
against the owner the conclusive presumption of consent, and so of
dedication.28
Public user for any length of time can give rise to an inference
of an offer to dedicate if the owner's consent can actually be
proven.29 In such a case, the period of public user is merely eviden-
tiary. On the other hand, adverse user must have occurred for at
least five years if adverse user is to give rise to a conclusive pre-
sumption of dedication. °
In either situation a finding of dedication will not result if the
courts determine that the public user was under a license. The cases
are not clear as to which party has the burden of showing the exis-
tence or nonexistence of a license except when the property in ques-
tion is open and unenclosed land. When the character of the land is
open and unenclosed, use by the public is generally attributed to
be under a license.3 1
GION v. CITY OF SANTA CRUZ
The Gion opinion 32 approaches the question of adverse public
user from a new perspective, making it clear that the landowner has
the burden of showing the existence of a license. Gion clearly
separates the principle of adverse user from that of permissive user,
or use under a license. Adverse user is determined by the intent of
the public rather than the acts of the owner. Thus, in determining
adverse user, the fact that an owner acts in a manner consistent with
a claim of complete dominion over the property is no longer con-
trolling.
Adverse public user for purposes of proving dedication is
similar to adverse private user for purposes of establishing prescrip-
tion.33 The court warned, however, that any analogies from the law
28 Id. at 593, 41 P. at 451.
29 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 38, 465 P.2d 50, 56, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162, 167-68 (1970); Morse v. Miller, 128 Cal. App. 2d 237, 245, 275 P.2d 545, 551
(1954).
30 Id.
31 City of Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou, 10 Cal. 2d 653, 668, 76 P.2d 483,
490 (1938); City of San Diego v. Hall, 180 Cal. 165, 168, 179 P. 889, 890 (1919);
F. A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 448, 150 P. 62, 68 (1915).
32 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1970).
33 Id. at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
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of prescription can be misleading.34 The adverse possessor or the
person attempting to gain a personal easement is attempting to gain
a personal property right." The test in such a situation is whether
the individual actually claimed a personal legal right in the prop-
erty. In establishing dedication, the public is trying to gain a public
right rather than a private right. The public need only show that
persons have used the land as they would have used public land."
Thus, if the land is a beach or shoreline, it must be shown that the
land was used as if it were a public recreational area. A separate
finding of "adverse" use is not necessary when there is evidence
that the public used the land, as it would public recreational land,
for five or more years without objection or interference.3 7
Although Gion did not specifically regard adverse public user
as being synonymous to public user without a license, or public
user without permission, the legal significance of license or permis-
sion was discussed. The court clarified prior cases regarding pre-
sumption of license and burden of proof by requiring that the
landowner affirmatively prove that a license has been granted to the
public. 8
The Gion opinion, as well as some previous cases,39 confused
the doctrine of implied dedication with the doctrine of prescription.
The Gion court allowed a dedication to be based solely on a finding
of adverse public user for a period of five or more years. As a result,
the intent of the public determines the character of use rather than
the intent of the landowner. The landowner's intent is indirectly
examined if he attempts to defeat the finding of dedication by
affirmatively proving he granted a license. If the landowner cannot
prove the existence of a license, a dedication can be based solely4"
34 Id.
35 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 39, 465 P.2d 50, 56, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162, 168 (1970); e.g., 2 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 340 (1961).
36 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 39, 465 P.2d 50, 56, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162, 168 (1970).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
39 See Comment, 7 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 65 n.1 (1918). See also Hartley v. Ver-
million, 141 Cal. 339, 74 P. 987 (1903) ; Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250, 251, 3 P. 871,
871 (1884); Smith v. Kraintz, 201 Cal. App. 2d 696, 701, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474
(1962); People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 896, 226 P.2d 702, 706 (1951).
40 In Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1970), the court, with respect to the Gion case (as opposed to the Dietz case)
could have based its finding of dedication on the fact that the owner indicated his
willingness to dedicate by not objecting to the substantial amount of maintenance and
improvement provided by the public, see text accompanying note 3 supra. But, in
the Dietz case, there were no facts to show willingness to dedicate other than the
owner's failure to object to the public use. Therefore, the court's decision could not
have been based on the facts of public expenditure because such expenditures were
peculiar to the Gion case.
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on a finding that the public used his land for five years, believing it
to be public land.
Prior to Gion the California courts were not receptive to the
argument of implied dedication when open beach land was in ques-
tion." Traditionally, the courts have attributed the use of open and
unenclosed land to be under a license. 2 Public use of beach land
for a long period of time precluded a finding of dedication without
additional proof that the owner intended to relinquish some of his
control to the public. In Hihn v. City of Santa Cruz,4 3 the court
said:
[W]here land is unenclosed and uncultivated, the fact that the public
has been in the habit of going upon the land will ordinarily be attributed
to a license on the part of the owner, rather than an intent to dedicate
(Cyc. 484.) This is more particularly true where the user by the
public is not over a definite and specified line, but extends over the
entire surface of the tract. (Cyc. 484.) It will not be presumed, from
mere failure to object, that the owner of such land so used intended to
create in the public a right which would practically destroy his own
right to use any part of the property.44
The cases of dedication based on adverse public user for five
or more years that were decided prior to Gion were concerned with
passageways or roadways. The courts had little difficulty in finding
an implied dedication in these road cases. In most instances, the
land was undeveloped and roads were greatly needed to foster com-
munication. To facilitate this need, various statutes were enacted
which provided that public use of roadways for a given period of
time constituted a dedication. Relying on these statutes, the courts
in earlier cases46 established the rationale by which later courts
applied public user to the common law theory of dedication in order
to arrive at the same conclusion.
41 See text accompanying note 44, infra. See also City of Manhattan Beach v.
Cortelyou, 10 Cal. 2d 653, 668, 76 P.2d 483, 490 (1938) ; City of San Diego v. Hall,
180 Cal. 165, 168, 179 P. 889, 890 (1919) ; F. A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170
Cal. 436, 448, 150 P. 62, 68 (1915). But see People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890,
897, 226 P.2d 702, 707 (1951), where the court states: "There is a general presump-
tion that a use by other than the owner is adverse and not permissive. While this
presumption is not as strong when the land is open and uncultivated and remote, as
when it is enclosed, cultivated and developed, .. . the presumption exists in either
case."
42 See text accompanying note 44 infra.
43 F. A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 150 P. 62 (1915).
44 Id. at 448, 150 P. at 68.
45 Cal. Stats., 1878, ch. CCCCLXIII, § 1, at 716 (1878); Cal. Stats., 1877, ch.
X, § 1, at 6 (1877) ; Cal. Stats., 1874, ch. CCCXLII, § 1, at 503 (1874) ; CAL. POL.
CODE § 2619 (1881).
40 Freshour v. Hihn, 99 Cal. 443, 34 P. 87 (1893); McRose v. Bottyer, 81 Cal.
122, 22 P. 393 (1889); Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250, 3 P. 871 (1884).
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In a similar manner, the Gion court felt that there was a sub-
stantial need for public beach land, thereby determining that public
policy favored an expansion of the doctrine of implied dedication
by public user to include shoreline areas.47 To support this argument
the court alluded to a number of statutes which,4" when read to-
gether, establish the legislative policy as favoring public access to
California's shorelines. However, these statutes cannot be construed
to authorize a finding of dedication on the basis of adverse public
user of a public easement over an entire plot for recreational pur-
poses.49
The Gion court failed to anticipate the greater burden a public
easement would place on the owner of beach land as opposed to the
lesser burden on the owner of a narrow strip of land. Each land-
owner occupies a substantially different position. In order to find
a public recreational easement, more proof than adverse public user
for five years should be required when the land in question is open
and unenclosed. More specifically, the owner's inaction should not
be sufficient to work a dedication. The courts should require a
showing of affirmative action by the landowner which manifests his
intent to dedicate, or a showing that the landowner knowingly
accepted substantial public improvements.50
47 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162, 172 (1970).
48 CALIF. CONST. art. XV, § 2, provides that no individual owning the frontage
of tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in the State,
shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such waters whenever it is required
for any public purpose. The Gion court provides a long list of authority to establish
that recreational purposes are recognized as "public purposes." The Gion court also
recognizes that although this provision of the California Constitution may be limited
somewhat by the United States Constitution, that nevertheless, they should encourage
public access to shoreline whenever possible: CAL. CIv. CODE § 830 (West 1954),
provides that absent special language in a deed, private ownership of shoreline ends
at the highwater mark. This statute has little relevance to the facts in the Gion
opinion since most of the land in question is above the highwater mark. In addition
to the two provisions mentioned above, the court listed the following legislative
enactments to indicate that there is strong public policy favoring public access to
the shoreline; CALIF. CONST. art. I § 25, guaranteeing the right to fish; CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 54090-93 (West 1968), relates to discrimination in beach access; CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 39933-37 (West 1968), requires municipalities to maintain access to navigable
waters; CAL. FIsH AND GAME CODE § 6511 (West 1958) and CAL. PUB. REs. CODE
§ 6008 (West 1956), place restrictions on the sales and leases of lands in Humbolt
Bay in order to preserve the public access; CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 6210.4 (West
1956), requires the state to reserve a convenient access to navigable water in connec-
tion with the sale or other disposition of shoreline lands; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6323
(West 1956), forbids structures on artificially accreted lands so that such accretions
will remain an unobstructed and open beach.
49 All of the statutes in question make reference only to access to navigable
waterways. See note 48 supra.
50 The landowner should be precluded from asserting that he never intended a
public easement to arise when he or his predecessor in title has not objected to the
government of the public expending a substantial amount of time or money for im-
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A Recreational Easement Creates a Greater Hardship than a Road
Easement
A road, unlike a beach, does not ordinarily encompass the land-
owner's entire acreage, but usually constitutes only a narrow strip.
The landowner is left in full control of the abutting land even if the
public gains a roadway easement. On the other hand, dedication
of beach land deprives the owner of most of the rights and privileges
generally associated with fee ownership. He cannot build a home
and enjoy the privacy normally experienced by a private home owner
due to the rights created in the public. These rights may preclude
him from building a home on the dedicated land since once the
public easement is established the landowner may not use the land
in a manner inconsistent with that easement."' For example, if the
public has used the proposed homesite for five consecutive years for
purposes of parking or recreation, it is likely that any structure
placed on that site will be prohibited52 since it would be inconsistent
with the easement. Furthermore, the landowner will lose his right
to sell his property free of the encumbrance created by the public
easement.
The conclusion reached in the Gion opinion is not a fair expan-
sion of the doctrine of adverse public user. The court reaches an
inequitable result if it finds a dedication based solely on the public's
use of another's land when the public is using that land in the mis-
taken belief that it is public property. In most instances, the land-
owner probably has no intention of creating any rights in the public.
It is more probable that the owner of beach land intends to allow the
public to use his land as long as they do not interfere with his enjoy-
ment or with his desire to develop the land at a later date. The land-
owner is faced with the possibility of losing valuable property rights
provement of his land. Cf. Diamond Match Co. v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665, 24 P.2d
783 (1933) ; Walter G. Brix Inc. v. Brown, 145 Cal. App. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 74 (1956).
51 See Robinson v. Cuneo, 137 Cal. App. 2d 573, 577, 290 P.2d 656, 658 (1955);
11 E. McQuniaN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33.66 (3d rev. ed. 1964);
2 G. THo PsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 431 (1961).
52 Prior to Gion the courts found dedication of a fee rather than an easement
when open recreation land was in question, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29,
45, n.3, 465 P.2d 50, n.3, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 172, n.3 (1970). Consequently, there is
no precedent in California which establishes the extent to which a landowner may
use his land when there is a public recreational easement over the entire plot. For
example, if the owner wanted to build a house on the land, whether or not such a
structure would interfere with the public easement would depend entirely on the
character of the land in relation to the extent of the public use. If the nature of the
land is such that a house built by the owner will not interfere with the public's en-
joyment of the easement, then the owner will probably be allowed to build. On the
other hand, if the land consists of one small lot that the public was using for a park-
ing area, a house built on that lot would clearly be inconsistent with the public
easement, and thus, the landowner would be prohibited from building on that lot.
Cf. Herzog v. Gosso, 41 Cal. 2d 219, 224, 259 P.2d 429, 433 (1953).
19711
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
which are guaranteed by the United States Constitution 3 as well
as the California Constitution.54 These rights are fundamental to
the people of California and should not be interfered with unless
absolutely necessary for the public welfare. When the government
finds that acquisition of public beach land is necessary to promote
the health, safety, and welfare of the public, then the government
and the public should bear the burden of condemning the land and
compensating the owner.55 Some protection should be afforded the
landowner in order to prevent the loss of his land to the public when
the landowner has done no more than abstain from objecting to the
public user. The California legislature could provide that public use
of recreational land for any length of time shall be presumed to be
under a license. Such a presumption would protect a landowner un-
less he were to do some act, in addition to acquiescing in the public
user, that would be inconsistent with a desire to retain full control
of the property.56
PROTECTIVE ACTION BY THE LANDOWNER
Without statutory protection, the landowner should be wary
when allowing the public use of his land. If the public has adversely
used the land for over five years, there is very little the landowner
can do to prevent a finding of dedication. If, however, an easement
has not yet vested in the public, the landowner can take steps to
protect himself.
Where the Land Has Been Used for Less Than Five Years
What effect will the Gion opinion have on the landowner whose
land has been used by the public for less than five years? The con-
clusive presumption of dedication only arises after five years of
adverse public use. Yet a court is not precluded from finding a
dedication based on public use for less than five years. The party
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides,
"... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ... "
54 CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 1 (West 1954), provides: "All men are by nature free
and independent, and have certain inalienable rights among which are those of en-joying and defending life, and liberty; acquiring and possessing, and protecting prop-
erty; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
55 CAL. CODE. CIv. PROC. §§ 1237 et seq. (West 1955).
56 See Diamond Match v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665, 24 P.2d 783 (1933); Hargo
v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623, 26 P. 1106 (1891); Walter G. Brix Inc. v. Brown, 145 Cal.
App. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 74 (1956); People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 890, 226 P.2d 702(1951); McKenzie v. Gilmore, 33 P. 262, 3 Cal. Unrep. 886 (1893). See text accom-
panying note 50 supra.
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asserting dedication would have to demonstrate that the landowner
has actually consented to a dedication. The public user in such a
case would represent acceptance of the owner's implied offer to
dedicate.57 There is nothing that an owner can do about his past acts
to prevent a finding of dedication based on those acts. However,
he can prevent a finding of dedication based on adverse public user
for five or more years.
The Gion court specifically discussed the necessary action that
a landowner must take to prevent a conclusive presumption of dedi-
cation from arising.
For a fee owner to negate a finding of intent to dedicate based on
uninterrupted public use for more than five years . . . he must either
affirmatively prove that he has granted the public a license to use his
property or demonstrate that he has made a bona fide attempt to
prevent public use. 58
The landowner's first reaction to Gion will probably be to pre-
vent public use in the future and thereby avoid the problem alto-
gether. In order to arrive at the most effective course of action, one
must consider the following questions: Has the public begun to use
the land, and if so, how many people are involved? Does the land-
owner live near the land or is he an absentee Owner? What is the
overall size and shape of the plot? Can it be effectively and efficiently
policed?
If the landowner resides on or near his land, and is in a position
to supervise the area, he could post "No Trespass" signs. Should
such signs prove ineffective he could order those persons using his
land to leave the property and could then institute trespass actions
against the offenders. These actions are practical, however, only
if there are small numbers of people defying the wishes of the land-
owner.
The landowner who is attempting to prevent public use of his
land must either be successful or his attempts must be "bona fide."
Otherwise, the owner's attempts will not be sufficient to thwart a
finding of dedication.59 One must look to the means used in relation
to the character of the property and the extent of the public use in
order to determine if the owner's attempts are "bona fide."6 The
Gion court stated: "[a] though 'No Trespass' may be sufficient when
57 See Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal. 2d 235, 241, 267 P.2d
10, 13 (1954) ; Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 593, 41 P. 448, 451 (1895).
68 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 41, 465 P.2d 50, 57, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162, 169 (1970).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169-70.
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only an occasional hiker traverses an isolated property, the same
action cannot reasonably be expected to halt a continuous influx of
beach users to an attractive seashore property."6'1
The landowner does not have to prevent, or attempt to pre-
vent, the public use of his land in order to avoid losing his property.
There is strong dictum in Gion which provides that a landowner can
avoid being victim to an implied dedication based on public user if
he can affirmatively grant a license to the public.62 The more gener-
ous landowner can allow the public to use his land while still evinc-
ing an intent to remain in full control. Section 813 of the California
Civil Code63 provides for public recordation of real property licenses.
That section was specifically enacted to protect the landowner from
losing his property rights by prescription and to provide notice to
users rather than future purchasers.64 Furthermore, the statute
implies that recordation provides constructive notice to public
users as well as private users. Strict compliance with section 813
does not provide the landowner with conclusive evidence of a li-
cense. It does, however, provide some evidence that the landowner
granted permission for a prescribed use on a given date. 5
Section 1008 of the California Civil Code6 provides the owner
with an additional course of action which further evinces his intent
to grant a license. It provides that no use by any person or persons
for any length of time will ever ripen into prescription if the owner
of the land posts signs at each entrance, or at intervals of at least
200 feet along the perimeter, which declare that the right to use
the land is by permission of the owner. Compliance with both sec-
tions would establish actual notice to the public that use is pursuant
to a license and constructive notice of the license granted as of
a given date.6
7
61 Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
62 Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
63 CAL. CIV. CODE § 813 (West Supp. 1969) provides: "The holder of record title
to land may record in the office of the recorder of any county in which any part of
his land is situated, a notice of consent to the use of his land, or any part thereof
for the purpose described in the notice. The recorded notice of consent is evidence
that the subsequent use of his land for such purposes is permissive and with consent.
• . . In the event of use by other than the general public, any such notices to be
effective, shall also be served by registered mail on the user. The recording of notice
of consent shall not be deemed to affect rights vested at time of recording."
64 1963 Code Legislation, 38 CAL. S.B.J. 601, 646 (1963).
65 Id.
66 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1008 (West Supp. 1969) provides: "No use by any person
or persons, no matter how long continued, of any land, shall ever ripen into an ease-
ment by prescription, if the owner of such property posts at each entrance to the
property or at intervals of not more than 200 feet along the boundary a sign reading
substantially as follows: 'Right to pass by permission, and subject to control, of
owner.'"
67 See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW oF SELECTED
1965 CoDs LEGISLATION, 48 (1965).
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In addition to the above, if the landowner could lease his land to
the city or state for a nominal sum, any use by the public under such
a lease could not give rise to a dedication." Neither a person nor
the public as an entity could acquire permanent rights since the
possessory estate is public property. California Civil Code Section
1007 provides in part that ". . . no possession by any person, firm
or corporation no matter how long continued of any land,... ease-
ment, or other property whatsoever . . .owned by the state or
any public entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right
against the owner thereof."69
By encouraging landowners to grant a license to the public
or to lease their shoreline property to the government, the beach
land shortage may temporarily be resolved. The public authorities
should take advantage, of this temporary remedy to acquire funds
that will enable the public to gain the necessary recreational land by
eminent domain and thereby provide the landowner with some
compensation for his loss.
The above suggestions will be beneficial to a landowner if
the public has used his land for less than five years. There are
many instances, however, when public use has occurred for more
than five years without any objection from the landowner. In such
a case, what action, if any, can the landowner take to avoid a finding
of dedication?
Where the Public Has Used the Land for Five or More Consecutive
Years
Gion provides that adverse public user for five or more years
gives rise to a conclusive presumption of dedication. As stated
earlier,"° the Gion opinion essentially creates in the public a right
of prescription, permanently establishing the right to use the beach
land after the fifth year of public use. If the public is able to prove
five years of adverse public use, the landowner's granting of a li-
cense would not prevent the easement from arising. The license in
such a case would be an attempt to give the public permission to do
that which it already has a right to do. In any event, the landowner
should grant a license since the public has the burden of proving
five consecutive years of adverse use. A license will at least protect
68 In light of the Gion opinion, it is highly unlikely that a public body will be
willing to become a lessee of beach land for the benefit of the public if it appears
that the public has used the land for five years. On the other hand, if the land is
good recreational land, and the public has not used it sufficiently to give rise to an
implied dedication, the governing body might be willing to come to terms.
69 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 1954).
70 See note 39 supra.
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the landowner where the public cannot meet this burden without
claiming use during those years after the granting of the license:
If the landowner is successful in terminating the public use,
or the public of its own volition decides to stop using the land, will
such termination of public use be sufficient to extinguish the public
rights? As a general rule, public easement rights, once created by
public use, cannot be defeated or impaired by a private claim based
on use adverse to the public right.71 However, if the landowner is
successful in terminating the public use for a period of five years,
there is a possibility that the easement will be extinguished. Section
811, subdivision four, of the California Civil Code provides: "A
servitude is extinguished: ... (4) When the servitude was acquired
by enjoyment, by disuse thereof by the owner of the servitude for
the period prescribed for acquiring title by enjoyment."72
The substance of section 811(4) was discussed in an early
California case, McRose v. Bottyer.73 That case involved a road
that had been dedicated in compliance with a statute74 which pro-
vided that all roads used as such in Butte county for a period of five
years shall be public highways. The dedication of this road was
based solely on evidence of public user, similar to the requirements
for dedication as announced in Gion. The McRose court said that
section 811(4) did not extinguish the easement because nonuse
had occurred for less than five years.7 1 The decision implies that
811(4) will be applied to public rights as well as private easements
when such rights are created by enjoyment. 6
However, it has been held77 that once dedication is complete,
nonuse or delay in use will not extinguish public rights. In these
71 See Hargo v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623, 26 P. 1106 (1891); People v. Sayig, 101
Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d 702 (1951); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West Supp. 1969),
provides in part, ". . . no possession by any person, firm, or corporation no matter
how long continued of any land, water, water right, easement, or other property
whatsoever dedicated to a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or
any public entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the owner
thereof."
72 CAL. CIv. CODE § 811(4) (West 1950).
73 McRose v. Bottyer, 81 Cal. 122, 22 P. 393 (1889).
74 Cal. Stats., 1874, ch. CCCXLII, § 1, at 503 (1874), provides: "All roads in
the County of Butte shall be public highways which are now used and have been so
declared by the Court of Sessions or Board of Supervisors, or which may be declared
hereafter by the Board of Supervisors. Also all roads used as such for a period of five
years."
75 McRose v. Bottyer, 81 Cal. 122, 125-26, 22 P. 393, 394 (1889).
76 Id.
77 Archer v. Salinas City, 93 Cal. 43, 28 P. 839 (1892); County of Sacramento
v. Lauszus, 70 Cal. App. 2d 639, 161 P.2d 460 (1945); Humbolt County v. Van
Duzer, 48 Cal. App. 640, 192 P. 192 (1920).
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cases, the courts did not rely solely78 on evidence of five or more
years of public user without objection or interference by the land-
owner. The scope of subdivision four of section 811 was not con-
sidered. In a situation where the public gained rights by merely
showing adverse public user for five or more years it would seem
desirable that 811(4) be applicable in order to protect the land-
owner. Furthermore, finding an extinguishment based on five or
more years of nonuse would not conflict with Section 1007 of the
California Civil Code79 since the extinguishment of the easement
would be based on nonuse by the pubic, not adverse use by the
landowner.
Even if a landowner is successful in stopping the public use for
a period of five years, it is still possible that a court would refuse
to apply section 811(4) to a public easement created by dedication.
The court could maintain that the easement was not created by
"enjoyment." The court could hold that public user is merely
evidentiary of the landowner's intent to dedicate. The Gion court
was careful to label the result of their decision an implied dedica-
tion rather than public prescription. It is likely, therefore, that
the courts in the future will refuse to apply Section 811(4) of the
California Civil Code to public rights that are created by public
user.
From the foregoing it is evident that the landowner who has
experienced public user for five years has little or no recourse to
prevent the public from claiming permanent easement rights. This
result is especially unfair to a landowner who, relying on the law
prior to Gion, did not affirmatively grant a license. Prior law did
not provide for a dedication of open recreational land without evi-
dence of acts by the owner that manifested his intent to dedicate
the land. ° Also, prior law presumed public use of recreation land
to be under a license from the owner.8l
If the landowner wishes to preserve his rights, he should do
everything possible to terminate the public use, or at least limit it
to an area of his land that will least interfere with his enjoyment
of the land. The extent of the public easement will depend on the
extent and character of use for any consecutive five year period. 2
If the public is using the entire plot for any five year period, tech-
78 See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
79 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
80 See note 41 supra.
81 See note 42 supra.
82 CAL. CIv. CODE § 806 (West 1954), provides: "The extent of a servitude is
determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the enjoyment by which it is
acquired."
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nically the public has a permanent right over the land. If, how-
ever, the owner is successful in limiting the use, the public may have
problems in proving that they had, at one time, used the whole plot
for five consecutive years. This action will not entirely free the
landowner from the public easement, but it might work to limit
that easement to an area that does not totally interfere with the
landowner's enjoyment of his land.
CONCLUSION
The Gion opinion constitutes a direct threat to the landowners
of California's shoreline.83 The landowner who was generous
enough to allow the public to use his land while it remained un-
developed is now prevented from terminating that use. If the
owner should decide to build a home on his land, he cannot expect to
enjoy the privacy that one normally expects as a private homeowner.
Also, if the landowner should decide to sell, he might have difficulty
receiving a fair price. The possibility that the land is subject to a
public easement for recreational purposes will severely cloud the
title. The extent of such an easement is so indefinite that a buyer
would be extremely cautious before parting with his money. As a
result, the owner of California's shoreline are being forced to
single handedly bear the burden of providing public beach land to
California's populace.
Charles R. Manzoni, Jr.
83 The threat of the Gion opinion is intensified if the local governing body de-
velops a definite policy with respect to gaining public easements over beach land by
implied dedication. Santa Cruz County has begun to develop such a policy. Follow-
ing is a list of some of the recommendations given to the County Board of Super-
visors from the County Counsel. The letter is dated November 10, 1970. "To protect
the public rights, the following actions should be taken: (Some of them are already
taken pursuant to the recommendation of the Parks and Recreation Commission
report.)"
1. Take an inventory of publicly used beach areas, access thereto, parking
lots, etc., used in conjunction with the beach. (This suggestion has already
been acted upon affirmatively).
2. Assign priorities to the public uses and areas.
3. Enlist public participation in taking the inventory and assigning priorities.
4. Instruct the Planning, Building Inspection, and Public Works Depart-
ments to refuse permits for use of shoreline property until such time as
the status of the public use has been determined. At this time, intensive
investigation of the factual basis for a claim of public rights should be
instituted. If there is substantial evidence of the existence of a public
easement inconsistent with the proposed private use, the permit should
be denied or conditioned so as to protect the public rights.
5. Institute regular, systematic and continuing surveillance of beach areas
with a view to collecting evidence of use, such as photographs, dates,
times, places, extent of use, and identification of potential witnesses.
6. At such time as a property owner makes an effort to halt public use in
any significant way, begin intensive investigation to determine if facts
warrant suit on behalf of the public to establish such public rights.
